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Abstract
This paper investigates the behavior of rent-seeking politicians in
an environment of increasing economic integration. The focus of
the paper is on the implications of globalization-induced political
yardstick competition for constitutional design with a view to the
current discussion in the European Union. In contrast to the
established literature, we carefully portray the double-tiered
government structure in federal systems. The number of lower-tier
governments and the allocation of policy responsibilities to the two
levels of government are subject to constitutional choice.
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Political Yardstick Competition, Economic Integration, and Constitutional
Choice in a Federation
1. Introduction
Federal constitutions
Constitutions establish the governance structures of nation states, provinces, and supra-
national organizations such as the European Union. In designing constitutions, arguably the
most important issue is to determine the extent to which collective decision-making should be
centralized. Three different types of government structures with respect to centralization are
usually distinguished: confederations, federations, and centralized (unitary) states. Whereas
confederations set up narrowly defined cooperation schemes among the participating
members which otherwise retain all the decision rights of sovereign states, in unitary states
cooperation is all-encompassing, i.e. all collective decisions are made at the center and the
constituent parts either disappear or are reduced to administrative districts. Between these two
extreme rules of collective decision-making, federal constitutions allocate policy
responsibilities to multiple tiers of governments; some collective decisions are made by the
constituent parts, the provinces (states, cantons, L￿nder, etc.), which can, in turn, assume a
federal structure of their own, and some collective decisions are made by the central authority,
the federal government.
Federal constitutions basically need to address three issues [cf. Inman and Rubinfeld (1997),
p. 53]. First, they need to specify the federal structure, i.e. the way in which the federation is
partitioned into provinces. In many incidences of state-building this issue was for all practical
purposes preordained by historical factors. The number and delineation of provinces may,
however, become an issue if the historic constraints vanish as time passes or if heterogeneous2
nation states are merged in a supranational federal system.
1 Second, the question arises which
policy responsibilities should be assigned to the provinces and which to the federal state. In
this context confederations and centralized systems can be interpreted as extreme versions of
a federation: a federation which assigns no policy responsibilities to the federal government is
a confederation and one which assigns no policy responsibilities to the provinces is a unitary
state. The third issue a federal constitution needs to resolve concerns the collective decision
rules which are to be applied at the federal level.
The objective of our investigation
This paper discusses federal constitutional design in an adverse political environment in
which the political principals, the voters, have only a very limited influence on their agents,
the incumbent governments. We portray the (post-election) political process with the help of
Leviathan governments which face a reelection constraint.
2 The third issue on the agenda of
federal constitutional design, the design of federal decision rules, therefore does not emerge;
our investigation rather focuses on the first two issues, i.e. the design of the federal structure
and the allocation of policy responsibilities. Moreover, we focus our investigation on a very
specific determinant of optimal constitutional choice, namely the effect of political yardstick
competition. Political yardstick competition emerges when the performance of the
governments in various jurisdictions becomes sufficiently comparable so that the voters can
alleviate the agency problem by making meaningful comparisons between jurisdictions.
Under these circumstances governments are forced to interact strategically with each other in
formulating their respective policies and thereby face a new constraint. Some recent evidence
documents that yardstick competition significantly affects the behavior of incumbent
                                                          
1 For a proposal to redraw the federal structure of the European Union, see, for example, DrŁze (1993).
2 This rather pessimistic view of government represents an appropriate background for constitutional choice
since constitutional rules should provide a safeguard even in a worst-case scenario [cf. Brennan and Buchanan
(1980)].3
politicians, the empirical evidence relating to the United States [cf. Besley and Case (1995)]
and Europe [Ashworth and Heyndels (1997)]. Our investigation acknowledges this insight
and asks the question as to how the intensity of yardstick competition - which we relate to
economic integration - affects the optimal design of a federation’s constitution.
We are thus concerned with positive and normative questions. The positive part of our study
analyzes how the federal structure and the assignment of policy responsibilities influences the
outcome of the ongoing political process. The normative part then builds upon the positive
analysis and derives recommendations with respect to the optimal design of a federation’s
constitution. The analysis is set up as a multi-stage game; the initial constitutional stage is
followed by an infinitely repeated stage which portrays the strategic interaction of the
incumbent governments in the post-election political process.
Two features of our model are quite novel and deserve some elaboration. The first one
concerns the role of the federal government. The policy recommendations of the traditional
literature on fiscal federalism notwithstanding, we observe that the qualitative difference
between the policy responsibilities of federal and province governments has become
increasingly blurred. We therefore conjecture that the voters are in a position to compare the
performance of the federal government (the president) with the performance of the province
governments (the governors) on the occasion of the presidential election. Moreover, since
politics at the federal and province level requires similar if not identical skills and ethical
prerequisites, governors with a good track record are the prime challengers of the incumbent
president. In our model we therefore assume that all incumbent governors aspire to the
presidency and that the incumbent governors are the only contenders. This set-up results in a
hierarchical rent-seeking contest in which restraint at the lower (province) level is rewarded
by a lottery ticket for a big prize ￿ the presidency. The restraint which is generated by the
federal structure cuts, of course, both ways, i.e. the incumbent president is also constrained in4
his rent-seeking behavior because he knows that in the next election his performance is
compared with the performance of the governors. The federation￿s two-tiered structure thus
contains a idiosyncratic set of incentives which are liable to constrain the governments at both
levels in their rent-seeking activities.
The second novel feature of our model is that we relate the intensity of political yardstick
competition to economic integration. We envisage a number of provinces or countries (for
example the member states of the European Union) whose governments provide a given set of
goods. The cost of the publicly provided goods is subject to a province-specific shock which
is not observable by the voters. The politician thus have an incentive to extract some rents by
overstating the cost. In the absence of a reelection constraint the politicians would present a
budget which equals total utility derived by the voters from the provision of the publicly
provided goods [ cf. Niskanen (1971)] ; in this extreme case in which the governments are only
constrained by a non-negative utility requirement (implemented, for example, by a budget
authorization process) the agency problem strongly favors the agents. The principals, i.e. the
voters, obtain a stronger position vis-a-vis their respective agents if the province-specific
shocks are correlated. Government performance then can be compared across provinces and
sanctioned in elections. We identify economic integration with an increase in the (positive)
correlation of the province-specific shocks. Economic integration thus increases the intensity
of political yardstick competition among the lower tier governments; our parameter
measuring the intensity of yardstick competition in lower tier elections (gubernatorial
elections) thus varies positively with economic integration.
3 The same reasoning applies to
the presidential election: if economic integration increases the correlation of the local cost
shocks and the federal government diversifies production of the provided goods across
                                                          
3 We do not provide a micro-foundation for our contest success functions because we do not treat the voters as
players who interact strategically with the politicians. Our modeling approach is more in line with the rent-
seeking literature [ cf. the survey by Nitzan (1994) and, in particular, Appelbaum and Katz (1986)]  than with the
literature on mechanism design [ cf. Seabright (1996) and, for a model which closely resembles our conception of
economic integration, Zantman (2000)] .5
provinces (federal highways, academic research, etc.), then economic integration will also
give rise to an increase in yardstick competition in presidential elections.
The related literature
Our paper relates to a substantial body of literature. By far the largest part of the economic
literature on federalism adopts a normative viewpoint by assuming that governments act as
loyal agents in the interest of their respective constituencies. This fiscal federalism literature
(cf. Oates 1998 and 1999), by definition, turns a blind eye to the arguably strongest argument
for the separation of powers via decentralized collective decision-making which can be traced
back at least to the Federalist Papers (1788), namely the appreciation that political
fragmentation contributes to the protection of mobile citizens￿ civil rights and liberties against
public authorities who may be tempted to abuse their coercive powers for egoistic purposes.
4
Political Yardstick competition is closely related to this line of reasoning because yardstick
competition imposes a constraint on elected governments even if the individual citizens are
immobile across jurisdictions.
More relevant for our investigation is the modern political-economic literature on federalism
which is based on a more realistic portrait of political motivation. The factors which have
been identified to influence the behavior of political-support motivated governments range
from local preference diversity (cf. Bolton and Roland, 1997), to budgetary externalities (cf.
Persson and Tabellini, 1994), spillovers (cf. Besley and Coate, 1999), scale economies (cf.
Alesina and Spolaore, 1997), and risk-sharing (cf. Persson and Tabellini, 1996, and Lee,
1998). These factors, incidentally, also play an important role in the traditional normative
literature. In any case, most investigations, whether they adopt a normative or a positive
                                                          
4 Political fragmentation may also protect minorities against exploitation undertaken by majorities [cf. Ellingsen
(1998)].6
viewpoint, compare completely decentralized with completely centralized collective decision-
making, i.e. they compare confederations with unitary states.
5
The political-economic literature on multi-tiered governance structures (federations) is still
very small but growing. Nechyba (1997) investigates a general equilibrium model of a
hierarchical government structure and derives conditions for the existence of a voting
equilibrium and for the stratification of mobile citizens into communities providing different
public good menus. The paper by Cremer and Palfrey (1999a) also employs the median voter
approach and offers an explanation for the observation that central governments tend to
intervene in lower-tier politics even when inter-jurisdictional externalities are minimal. The
median voter approach, whatever its merits may be, is certainly not suitable to endogenize
redistribution policies. W￿rneryd (1998), therefore, employs the standard rent-seeking
approach to investigate the efficiency losses resulting from political contestablity of rents
under different governance structures. He concludes that rent dissipation in a unitary state
exceeds rent dissipation under federalism. Dixit and Londregan (1998) portray income
redistribution with a model of electoral competition and show that the policy outcome in a
federation can be very different from that in a unitary state because federations, on the one
hand, allow for divided governments resulting in less stark policy outcomes, but, on the other
hand, can admit multiple equilibria with the attendant risk of unpleasant welfare
consequences for a large part of the voters.
Our study is most closely related to Cremer and Palfrey (1999b), Wrede (2000) and Zantman
(2000). Just as we do, the paper by Cremer and Palfrey focuses on the optimal design of
federal structures but it does not consider the effects of political yardstick competition. The
papers by Wrede and Zantman, on the other hand, deal with political yardstick competition,
                                                          
5 The neglect of federal systems in the literature appears to be a legacy from the influential work by Tiebout
(1956) who not only juxtaposed unitary states and confederations, but also completely ignores the prevailing
political institutions. Investigating the role of political institutions in a Tiebout world is a relatively recent line of
research (cf. Kollman et al., 1997,  and Caplan, 2001).7
but they analyze non-hierarchical government structures and focus their investigation on the
optimal voter response. The paper by Zantman, however, bears a close resemblance to our
analysis by squarely addressing the issue of economic integration and its repercussions for
governments drawn into yardstick competition.
2. The Model
Consider a federation with two layers of government: the federal government headed by the
president and n province governments headed by governors. The public sector provides a
given set of goods normalized to unity. The publicly provided goods may be private goods or
local public goods which do not generate any spillovers across provinces. The fraction of the
goods provided by the federal government is denoted by 1-q. All provinces are assumed to be
identical with respect to the allocation of goods provided by the federal government; i.e. each
of the n provinces receives from the federal government the fraction (1-q)/n of the publicly
provided goods and the individual province governments supplement the federal allocation by
the fraction q/n.
The federal and the province governments are portrayed as Leviathans whose objective is to
maximize the rent Rk (k=f,1,...,n) which they extract from their respective jurisdictions. The
extracted rent Rk is the difference between the tax revenue Tk and the cost Ck of the publicly
provided goods: Rk=Tk-Ck, where Cf=(1-q)cf and Ci=(q/n)ci for i=1,...,n.
6 We assume that the
voters do not know the per unit cost (input price) ck of the publicly provided goods, they only
observe the tax revenue Tk in each jurisdiction. Despite this lack of information, rent
extraction is nevertheless bounded via the budget-authorization and the reelection constraint
faced by the president and the governors. The reelection constraints become more restrictive
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Linearity of the cost function implies that constitutional choice is not influenced by scale effects. This feature is
in line with our focus on the yardstick effects.8
the more correlated the input prices are known to be since the voters are then better are able to
compare the performance of the incumbent officials across jurisdictions. Price correlation
forces the incumbent officials to compete against each other in a political yardstick
competition.
We portray political yardstick competition via the probability of an incumbent to be reelected
to office. We do not derive the election probabilities from the microeconomic fundamentals -
such a micro-foundation can be found in Zantman (2000) ￿ but rather adopt a macroeconomic
view and base our analysis directly on the employed contest success functions. In our model
of a two-tiered government structure we have to take into account that the governors may
aspire to the presidency. In fact, in order to emphasize the nexus between the federal and the
province-level governments which is established by the yardstick competition effect, we
assume that only governors challenge the incumbent president. The reelection probability Pf
of the incumbent president therefore depends, apart from the constitutional variables n and q,
on the past performance of the incumbent president and the past performance of the governors
as measured by bk,
(1)  bk= Uk-Tk, (k=f,1,...n),
where Uf/n=((1-q)/n)u and Ui=(q/n)u (1=1,...,n) denote the gross utilities derived from the
respective government services. The assumed linearity of the utility functions guarantees that
the voters￿ total gross utility Uf+Ui is not affected by the constitutional assignment of policy
responsibilities.
7 Moreover, we assume that the voters￿ net utility bk is non-negative, bk≥0,
because all governments are restricted by a budget authorization constraint.
For analytical convenience we will use the standard parametric specification of the contest
success function Pf (bf, b1,￿,bn) due to Tullock (1980):
                                                          
7 Linearity, moreover, implies risk neutrality on the part of the voters. This specification, therefore, does not
allow to portray the social insurance feature of multi-layered government systems. Our modeling strategy is to




























Notice, that the governors￿ performance levels bi are made comparable to the president￿s
performance bf by the adjustment weight n(1-q)/q. Government performance is, of course, an
instrument variable of the governments￿ maximization calculus since performance depends on
rent extraction via  bf=(1-q)v-Rf and bi=(q/n)v-Ri.
8 The parameter φ≥1 measures the extent to
which the president is exposed to yardstick competition. For very large values of φ, reelection
of the president is for all practical purposes guaranteed, i.e. Pf assumes a value very close to
unity which signifies the absence of yardstick competition and thus portrays a president in the
position of an unchallenged Leviathan. If φ equals unity, the president’s performance is
perfectly comparable to the performance of the governors; under these circumstances
yardstick competition is perfect.
9






























To provide a feeling for the contest success functions 2a and 2b which portray the yardstick
contest taking place at the federal level, assume that the federal government produces 50% of
all publicly provided goods (q=1/2). The remaining 50% is produced by two province
governments (n=2). Let the performance levels in period t=1 be bf=5, b1=3 and b2=1; total
voter satisfaction thus equals Σb=9. What then is the probability of the three contestants to
                                                          
8 As mentioned above, we adopt the rent-seeking approach and base our investigation directly on the postulated
contest-success functions, i.e. on equation (2a) and on the equations (2b) and (3) below.  We thereby relegate the
underlying input price variation into the background of the analysis and work with a given level v of per unit
voter satisfaction (gross of rent extraction) which in a truly micro-based model would recur to the price variation
and the respective asymmetric distribution of information via v=u-ck.
9 Notice, that the parameter ϕ  may also contain an incumbency advantage.10
gain the presidency in period t=2? If all three politicians were as efficient (or, negatively
formulated, as greedy) as the incumbent president, total voter satisfaction would amount to
bf/(1-q)=10. If all three politicians were as efficient as the incumbent governor of province i
(i=1,2), total voter satisfaction would amount to b1/(q/n)=12 and b2/(q/n)=4, respectively. The
sum over the three counterfactual satisfaction levels is thus 10+12+4=26 and, for φ=1, the
election probabilities can be seen to correspond to the respective ratios: Pf=10/26=39%,
P1=12/26=46%, and P2=4/26=15%.
Yardstick competition, of course, also takes place at the province level. We assume that the
gubernatorial elections are contests between two candidates, one candidate being, as a rule,
the incumbent governor. The challenger has no record as a public official. The voters
therefore assume that the challenger, if elected, would be of average quality, i.e. the b-value
of the challenger is set equal to the average b-value of all other incumbent governors.
10 Under
these circumstances the province-level contest success functions which correspond to the



























where Qi denotes the probability that the incumbent governor i is reelected. The parameter
θ≥1 which measures the intensity of yardstick competition at the province level has the same
interpretation as the yardstick φ at the federal level: the smaller θ the more competitive are the
contests for the gubernatorial offices.
11
In our game we envisage the following sequence of moves: at a first, constitutional, stage the
parameters n and q are chosen by a constituent assembly. At the following stage of the game
the elected officials simultaneously determine the level of rent extraction in their respective
                                                          
10 We do not include the competing incumbent in the average in order not to provide this candidate with an
opportunity to influence the yardstick. In this assumption we follow Shleifer (1985).11
jurisdictions. The voters are not modeled as fully fledged players, their behavior is rather
summarized in the contest success functions (2a and b) and (3), i.e. by a move of nature which
takes place at the end of each period.
12 The second stage of the game which portrays the
ongoing political process is infinitely repeated, whereby we assume that the elected officials
have an infinite time horizon. Moreover, we assume that an office holder who is not reelected
will never come back.
We analyze our dynamic game by backward induction. In the following section we derive for
a given constitution the equilibrium rent extraction levels. Section 4 then derives the optimal
constitution and shows how optimal constitutional design changes in an environment of
increasing economic integration.
3.  The political process
The calculus of the governments
The objective of the elected officials is to maximize the expected value of rent extraction over
time, whereby future payoffs are discounted with the discount rate β.
13 Since the decision
environment does not change as time passes, we can represent the objective functions of the
politicians with the help of value functions. The incumbent president maximizes the value
function
14
(4) ( ) )) 1 ( ( ) ( ),..., ( ), ( ) ( max )) ( ( 1 ) 1 ( + + = + t R V t R t R t R P t R t R V f n f f f t R f f β
yielding the first-order necessary condition
(4a) ( ) 0 )) 1 ( ( ’ ) ( ),..., ( ), ( 1 = + t R V t R t R t R P f n f f β
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 Again, this parameter may also contain an incumbency advantage.
12 This modeling strategy is similar to, for example, Appelbaum and Katz (1986).
13 The assumption that the politicians are risk does not unduly restrict the generality of our analysis. For the role
of risk aversion in rent seeking games, see Hillman and Katz (1987) and Konrad and Schlesinger (1999).
14 Arguments other than the own rent extraction are suppressed in the presentation of the value function.12
which implies that V￿(Rf (t+1))=0. Using this information and the envelope condition, we
arrive at
(4b) 0 )) 1 ( ( 1 )) ( ( ’ = +
∂
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We focus in our analysis on stationary equilibria. Using the fact that in a stationary




























The maximization calculus of the incumbent governors is analogous. Denoting with Xi the
probability that governor i does not win the presidential election but does win the subsequent
gubernatorial election, i.e. the probability of being reelected (Xi=(1-Pi)Wi), the governors’
value functions can be written as
(5) ( )
() )) 1 ( ( ) ( ),..., ( ), (
)) 1 ( ( ) ( ),..., ( ), ( ) ( max )) ( (
1
1 ) 1 (
+ +
+ + = +
t R V t R t R t R X
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i n f i
f n f i i t R i f
β
β
with the attendant first-order necessary conditions and envelope conditions
(5a) [] 0 )) 1 ( ( ’ 0 )) 1 ( ( ’ = + ⇒ = + t R V t R V X i i i β     and
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The two equations (4d) and (5d) describe the equilibrium of the political process, i.e. the rent
extraction Rf and Ri, as a function of the model’s parameters n, q, θ and φ.
15 The two core
equations (4d) and (5d) comprise the value V(Rf) given in equation (4c), the probabilities Pf,
Pi and Wi (which is a factor of Xi=(1-Pi)Wi) given in (2a), (2b) and (3), and the three partial






























































































































We are now in a position to analyze the relationship between the design of the federation￿s
constitution given by the tupel (q,n) and total rent dissipation ΣRk occurring in the political
process. Formally we thus seek the comparative static properties of the maximization calculus
presented above. Since the core equations of our model - the first-order conditions or reaction
functions which are essentially given in (4d) and (5d) - do not admit an analytical derivation14
of the signs of the partial derivatives dRk/dn and dRk/dq (k=f,1,...,n), we computed the
numerical equilibrium values of Rk for different values of the constitutional assembly￿s
instrument variables n and q with the help of a simulation program (based on MATLAB).
The results of the numerical simulation for the representative parameter constellation ϕ =30 ,
θ =10  and β =0.9 are summarized in Figure 1. This figure shows that, depending on the values
of the constitutional variables n and q, four qualitatively different equilibrium regimes can
emerge.
Regime 1 (honest governors and a moderately corrupt president):
 For small values of n and q the governors turn out to implement an efficient policy, i.e. they
do not extract any rents for their own benefit (Ri=0 for i=1,...,n). The president, on the other
hand, takes advantage of his high office and extracts a positive rent.
16 The president, however,
does not go to the limit, i.e. he leaves the citizens a positive net utility from federal policy. In
other words, Rf falls short of the maximum rent which the president can, in principle, extract
(Rf <1-q).
17 This type of equilibrium emerges because an ￿honest￿ governor￿s probability of
being elected president is relatively large as long as the incumbent president has a bad track
record and the number of governors (fellow challengers) is small. Moreover, the contested
prize is high since the federal government￿s policy responsibilities are extensive which
implies a large potential for rent extraction at the federal level. The incumbent president￿s
prospects of being reelected varies negatively with n and Rf. If n is small, the trade-off
between present rent extraction and reelection prospects (future rent extraction) allows the
president to grab a substantial sum without unduly compromising his reelection prospects.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
15 A further condition which needs to hold in equilibrium is the participation constraint which guarantees that the
governors have an incentive to run for president. In all of the numerical simulations presented below, the
participation constraint turned out to be satisfied.
16 Since the presidency does not have any intrinsic value and the president￿s inefficiency can only be sanctioned
by throwing him out of office (which results in a zero pay-off), he will always extract a positive rent.
17 Since we normalize per unit voter satisfaction v to unity, the maximum rent the president can possibly extract
per period amounts to 1-q15
Regime 2 (honest governors and a completely corrupt president):
 A second type of equilibria emerges if the number n of provinces is sufficiently large while q
remains at a low value. Under these circumstances the incumbent president is still in a
position to substantially enrich himself in one electoral period but he now faces many
challengers and his reelection prospects are dim. He therefore grabs all he can get (Rf=1-q)
and retires. The governors￿ best choice remains to be honest (Ri=0) in order to qualify for the
presidential contest.
Regime 3 (moderately corrupt politicians):
 If the policy responsibility of the federal government becomes sufficiently small, i.e. if the
policy responsibilities of the province governments become sufficiently large, the president
can extract less and less in a given election period if he wants to keep his probability of
reelection unchanged. This is so because his reelection probability depends on the ratio of the
size of policy responsibilities and the budget. The president, therefore, converts (in absolute
terms) into a more honest agent as q increases. Correspondingly, the governors can extract
larger rents as their policy responsibilities grow without compromising their prospects of
electoral success. We therefore observe a third type of equilibria in which all contestants
extract rents but do not go to the limit (0<Ri<q/n, Rf<1-q).
Regime 4 (moderately corrupt governors and a completely corrupt president):
For a sufficiently large number of provinces, a fourth equilibrium regime emerges between
the regimes 2 and 3: the province governors begin to extract rents (Ri>0) in the course of an
increase in their policy responsibilities before the president begins to back down from his hit-
and-run strategy (Rf=1-q).16
4. The Constitutional Stage
Optimal Constitutional Design
In the previous section we have identified four equilibrium regimes: the federal government
(the president) can either be moderately or completely corrupt, the province governments (the
governors) can either be honest or moderately corrupt. Which regime is the best? Since a no-
corruption regime is not feasible, we need to look for a constitutional design which minimizes
total rent extraction ΣRk=Rf+nRi and thereby maximizes the citizens￿ welfare. The choice
variables of the constituent assembly are the number n of provinces and the distribution of
political responsibilities to the federal and provincial governments as measured by q.  The
citizens￿ welfare W (which in our numerical simulations is normalized to values in the unit
interval: W=1-ΣRk) thus depends on in the instrument variables n and q and on the exogenous
variables ϕ  and θ  measuring the intensity of yardstick competition. Taking the parameter
constellation used in the previous section (ϕ =30,  θ =10,  β=0.9), the simulated values of
W(n,q) indicate that the maximum welfare W occurs at n*=7 and q*=36.15%. This implies
that the best constitution for ϕ =30 and θ =10 is to divide the federation into 7 provinces, to
assign 1-q*=63.85% of the policy responsibilities to the federal government and to leave the
individual provinces with q*/n*=5.16% of the policy responsibilities.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the optimal constitution (q*=36.15%, n*=7) lies on the border-line
between regime 1 (honest governors, moderately corrupt president) and regime 3 (moderately
corrupt governors and moderately corrupt president). This is so because the constituent
assembly wants to keep the governors honest. In order to minimize rent extraction at the
federal level, the federal government￿s policy responsibilities need to be minimized, i.e. the
constituent assembly maximizes q under the constraint that the governors remain honest.17
Yardstick Competition and Constitutional Choice
Having shown how, in principle, the optimal constitution (n*,q*) can be derived for given
values of the exogenous variables θ and φ, the next step in our investigation is to analyze the
influence of yardstick competition at the provincial and federal level on optimal constitutional
design, i.e. we want to discuss the qualitative features of the functional relationships n*(θ,φ)
and q*(θ,φ). Since θ and φ vary negatively with economic integration, these insights contain
some indications as to how a constituent assembly should behave if faced with a situation of
deepening economic integration.
Above we have derived n* and q* for one specific parameter constellation (θ=10, φ=30). In
order to provide a feeling for what is going on, it appears advisable to elaborate a little on the
shape of the welfare function W(n, q) for given values of θ and φ before we show our
numerical results for n* and q* for some more parameter constellations (θ, φ). Since it is
cumbersome to visualize three-dimensional representations of the welfare function W(n, q),




n W  function for our reference environment θ=10 and φ=30, where q
+(n)
denotes the welfare maximizing q for a given n. It can be seen that the graph of  ) (
~
n W  is
bimodal. As noted above, the absolute maximum (W=0.5610) is located at the point n=7; the
relative maximum is located at the upper limit of n.
18
Figure 3 depicts the graphs of the  ) (
~
n W  functions for φ=10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 (the parameter
measuring the intensity of yardstick competition at the province level remains at θ=10).
Setting the upper limit of n ad hoc at  100 = n , we see that for φ<20 the welfare maximizing n
jumps to the upper bound n=100. Moreover, it transpires that for φ>20 the welfare
maximizing n varies positively with the parameter φ measuring the intensity of yardstick
competition to which the incumbent president is exposed. A more complete picture of the18
relationship between optimal constitutional design (n*, q*) and the intensity of political
yardstick competition is provided in Table 1. The numerical simulation-results reported in
Table 1 document the following results.
Result 1: If the intensity of yardstick competition for the president’s office becomes
sufficiently large (φ sufficiently small), it is optimal to partition the federation in as many
provinces as is technically possible. The optimal fraction of policy responsibilities assigned to
the provincial governments is in this case at a maximum.   
The province-proliferation result is, to some extent, an artifact of our neglect of scale
economies and spillovers in the provision of public goods. On a deeper level, however, the
result reflects the fact that a president who does not have a realistic chance of being reelected
will face only the non-negative utility constraint. He will, therefore, extract as much as he can
during his one-period incumbency. Since this is well understood, the constituent assembly
grants the federal government only limited policy responsibilities in order to restrict rent
extraction at the federal level. This leaves the provinces with extensive policy responsibilities
which, in turn, sets the stage for corruption at the province level. In order to curb the
corruption incentives of the governors, the number of provinces is increased; the policy
responsibility of an individual province is thus extremely reduced with the consequence that
rent extraction would severely compromise a corrupt governor’s election prospects.
We now turn to values of φ for which the optimal number n of provinces is unconstrained.
Result 2: For φ sufficiently large, an increase in the intensity of yardstick competition
between the province governments (i.e. a decrease in θ) calls for a constitutional change
which assigns the province governments more policy responsibilities and increases the
number of provinces (or leaves it unchanged).
                                                                                                                                                                                    
18 For n=1000, we obtain W=0.5364.19
Also this result can readily be understood. An increase in the intensity of yardstick
competition between lower-tier governments reduces the provincial governments￿ proclivity
to corruption which immediately gives rise to a redistribution of policy responsibilities
towards these governments. Moreover, since the federal government’s reelection prospects,
ceteris paribus,  decrease as the president￿s policy responsibilities shrink, the federal
government can be expected to become less corrupt. Under these circumstances it may be
possible to increase the number of provinces (which reduces the province governments￿
proclivity to corruption even further) without unduly jeopardizing ￿ via increased competition
for the presidency ￿government efficiency at the federal level.
Result 3: For φ sufficiently large, an increase in the intensity of yardstick competition for the
president￿s office (i.e. a decrease in φ) calls for a constitutional change which assigns the
province governments less policy responsibilities and decreases the number of provinces.
This mirrors Result 2. If φ decreases, the president’s probability of being reelected, ceteris
paribus, also decreases. As a consequence he is tempted to increase rent extraction because
his reelection prospects are bleak anyway. To counter this invitation to corruption, two
measures will be taken: first, the president￿s policy responsibilities are increased in order to
tempt him with a second term if he does not grab too much in the present term, and, second,
the number of provinces is decreased since this reduces the number of contestants in the
presidential election and thus provides a compensating factor for the exogenous decrease in
the president’s reelection prospects. If, however, these measures are not strong enough to
counter the increase in yardstick competition the constitutional policy is reversed, i.e. the
president￿s policy responsibilities are severely curtailed and we end up in the domain of
Result 1.20
Economic Integration and Federal Constitutional Design
What are now the consequences of our analysis for federal constitutional design in an
environment of increasing economic integration? Since economic integration, first of all,
makes government performance of equivalent jurisdictions more comparable, yardstick
competition between the provinces will increase; in terms of  our model, this increase in
yardstick competition between provinces is portrayed by a decrease in the value of the
parameter  θ. As economic integration deepens, an optimal federal constitution should,
therefore, little by little increase the number of provinces and, at the same time, increase the
policy responsibilities of the lower-tier governments at the expense of the center. In this
respect globalization and federalization should thus go hand in hand.
Of course, increasing economic integration may also render the performance of the federal
government more comparable to the performance of the province governments, especially if
the federal government has many policy responsibilities to begin with. If this is the case,
yardstick competition for the president￿s office also increases, i.e. the value of the yardstick
parameter φ may well decrease in the course of economic integration. This would, in contrast
to the first effect, call for a reduction in the number of lower-tier governments and also a
reduction of policy responsibilities allocated to the provinces.
Notice, however, that the φ-induced centralization-effect holds only if the intensity of
yardstick competition at the upper level still remains at relatively low values, i.e. for φ
sufficiently large. If economic integration drives φ down to a sufficiently low value, the
recommendation with respect to constitutional design reverses: highly integrated federal
systems should be extremely fragmented and should entrust the federal state with a minimum
of policy responsibilities. Since decisions with respect to a federation’s stratification are
largely irreversible, this leads us to conclude that in the age of globalization a reduction in the
number of lower-tier governments may turn out to be a rather short-sighted and costly21
strategy. If one acknowledges that constitutions are hard to change, economic integration
continuing for an unforeseeable future calls for a decidedly decentralized federal constitution.
5. Conclusions
Increasing economic integration has a momentous effect on government. Whereas some
commentators deplore the decline in government power which results from increasingly
footloose tax bases and argue for a countervailing centralization of public decision making,
others welcome the fact that governments begin to feel the need to compete against each other
and consequently oppose any centralization. The two views are predicated on the observer￿s
image of government. Traditional economists interpreting government as benevolent agents
of the society at large are inclined to advocate more centralized public decision structures,
whereas political economists who focus more on the dark side of government, take the
opposite view. Our analysis is in the political economy tradition and addresses two closely
related questions: first, how does increasing economic integration impact on the efficiency of
governments in a federal system, and, second, what are the consequences of a globalizing
environment for the optimal design of a federal constitution?
In analyzing these questions we focus on a single aspect of endogenous federal policy
determination, namely on the fact that increasing economic integration makes government
performance more comparable. Our focus on political yardstick competition in a model which
disregards interjurisdictional mobility of tax bases thus complements literature on tax
competition.
Our general result calls for a federal structure which becomes more decentralized as economic
integration deepens - decentralization meaning that the number of lower-tier government￿s
should be rather increased than decreased and that the federal governments policy
responsibilities should be reduced and shifted to the provinces. This conclusion will be22
welcomed by all those of us who observe, for whatever reasons, government centralization
(for example in the European Union) with a healthy dose of reservation if not apprehension.
Nevertheless, academic integrity requires to emphasize that our constitutional policy
recommendation is, of course, predicated on the specific focus of our study. Political
yardstick competition is an important consequence of globalization ￿ but by far not the only
one. A balanced investigation into optimal constitutional design not only needs to consider all
pertinent determinants but also a richer model encompassing, for example, more institutional
details of public decision making and an endogenous treatment of the size of the whole public
sector.23
Table 1: Globalization and the optimal federal constitution













































































































n: bold entries, q: percentage values, W: entries in italics24
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